Before I begin my direct discussion of sacrifice as understood in the philosophies of Kant and Bataille, it seems necessary to discuss the philosophical understanding which surrounded their beliefs on the topic of sacrifice. Discussion of each philosopher’s notion of the sacred, or in Kant’s case the noumenal, will likely be of central importance to the discussion of the sacrifice, as even a brief examination show that the word sacrifice itself is related in meaning to the word sacred.
In order to develop an understanding of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and subsequently, the significantly more fluid philosophical work of George Bataille, it helps to grasp the progression of western thought from which they proceeded. While I will not explain in this paper the entirety of notable western philosophical thought which preceded them, I will briefly comment on the Rationalist and Empiricist movements which were the backdrop and groundwork for Kant’s philosophical writing.
The Rationalists, as the term suggests, were a series of philosophers who believed that reason was the only reliable source of philosophical disclosure, and the only way to make progress in understanding the world. They also proposed that because senses could be fooled, experience was not useful in generating reliable philosophical insights. A reaction to them came in the form of the Empiricists, who suggested that only experience in the world could teach you anything. From these two traditions of philosophy, Kant emerges as a kind of synthesis.
In Kant’s transcendental philosophy, we see a stark distinction between the phenomenal realm and the noumenal realm. In the phenomenal realm is found all phenomena. That is, it holds all that which is part of the material order of the world. The noumenal realm contains the moral law, reason, ideas, and anything which is not a part of the material order of the world and yet is still in some way present. This distinction afforded Kant a resolution to the discrepancy between the rationalist and empiricist traditions, without giving up the advantages of either tradition. For example, Kant now had the basis for a priori and a posteriori knowledge. That is, he could reconcile in a satisfactory manner why some things could be known independent of experience, and why some things could be known only after an experience. This distinction plays itself out in this discussion of the sacred and sacrifice, as the sacred, in Kant’s work, is found entirely in the noumenal realm.
However, in order to proceed further, I should lay forth what exactly is meant by “the sacred”. The sacred is a term describing that which is valued independent of material systems of valuation. Hence the significance of a wooden cross, favorite shirt, or flag in the face of apparent material worthlessness.
While in my readings of Kant, I have not come across a specific discussion of the sacred itself, Kant does discuss the noumenal realm and its relationship to other topics (the church for example). I think that in these discussions of the relationship between the noumenal and other topics we see a description of the sacred. For my primary example I would point to his discussion in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. In a section on “Philosophical Account of the Victory of the Good over the Evil Principle in the Founding of a Kingdom of God on Earth”, he discusses the difference between ecclesiastical faith and pure religious faith. He makes the point that faith can either be centered on a noumenal understanding, or a phenomenal understanding. Phenomenal understandings of faith are characterized by adherence to doctrine. By contrast, noumenal understandings of faith are characterized by an attempt to do good independent of doctrine. For example, one of the long standing arguments in religion, which extends back to the birth of Christianity, is between following the letter of God’s law or trying to get at the spirit of the law. The sacred is described to some extent in this account of pure religious faith. It is faith which is based to some extent outside the order of the material world.
Similarly Bataille holds to the idea that the sacred is not something which is to be grasped in the way in which someone would grasp the profane, or as Kant would describe it, the phenomenal. He describes the sacred as containing spirits, gods, and other things which could be understood in a mythological sense, or to put it another way, in a supernatural-physical sense. However, I think by these terms he does not refer to physical entities so much as something of a more intangible nature. Intangible, felt (emotionally) rather than sensed, is the nature of Bataille’s notion of the sacred. Even in the very concrete thought of Heidegger, mood and feeling are a part of that which is observed only in the introspective sense, or the sense of looking beyond the physicality of phenomena. Another way of explaining this is to say that the sacred is the realm of meaning. Bataille’s statement “Animals, plants, tools, and other controllable things form a real world with the bodies that control them, a world subject to and traversed by divine forces, but fallen.”[1] is an indicator of this.
What sacrifice holds in terms of common meaning, both with Kant and Bataille and in terms of lexical definition, is that sacrifice is the giving up for the divine. In other words, sacrifice is the giving up of the materially valuable for that which is spiritually meaningful. In terms of a more precise philosophical definition, sacrifice is the act of exchanging that which is valued for meaning. This is why the objects of sacrifice are lost or destroyed in the sacrifice and why the best sacrifices are things of value. If nothing is given up, nothing can be exchanged. If much is given up, much is gained. This is very likely why Jesus says “For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it.”[2] (Mark 8:35)
This, put in more Kantian terms is sacrifice as an act which takes something phenomenal and lends some sort of noumenal value. However, though this is the same idea in Kantian terminology, it is so for purposes of comparison, not to indicate a Kantian perspective. While again, I have not come across a direct discussion of self sacrifice with respect to the moral law, as near as I currently understand Kant, I find that a particular quote sheds some light on how Kant would have addressed the issue. “When any one does, in conformity with duty, more than he can be compelled to do by the law, it is said to be meritorious (meritum). What is done only in exact conformity with the law, is what is due (debitum). And when less is done than can be demanded to be done by the law, the result is moral demerit (demeritum) or culpability.”[3] I understand this to mean that Kant would hold that if someone exceeds their moral responsibility they gain what might in Bataille be found as the value of sacrifice. However, the material impact of loss incurred while carrying out the moral law would be largely irrelevant. This seems to me to be the most significant difference between Bataille and Kant with respect to sacrifice and the sacred.
Also, as Kant did not directly address the sacred as the sacred, and rather addressed the notion of the noumenal realm and its moral law, Kant was ill equipped to address the significance of the destruction of valuable phenomenal objects for the purpose of attaining spiritual gain. It is explained in Bataille’s work that sacrifice is a making of meaning out of profane. He also refers to this as, making the useful useless, and as moving the profane into the sacred.
In conclusion it seems as though sacrifice is distinct for Kant and Bataille in that Kant’s conceptions of the noumenal realm and of the moral law leave no room for anything except duty. For Kant, only when sacrifice is the giving up of something for duty, will a sacrifice produce its intended result. Even then it is the consistency with duty, not with the giving up of anything that gives meaning. This is because the phenomenal realm is valueless and irrelevant to the moral law. Bataille, by contrast, integrates these two realms, and in the overlap is the possibility of sacrifice made meaningful.
source
http://www.ferrum.edu/philosophy/david.htm
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Potter Box -Decision Making Model
SITUATION
Two ten-year-olds go to trial for kidnapping and brutally murdering two-year-old Jason Bugler
VALUES
British Television: honor the court restrictions against reporting juvenile names
U.S. Newspaper: do not suppress public information
PRINCIPLE
British Television: other-regarding care
U.S. Newspaper: truthtelling is categorical imperative
LOYALTIES
British Television: to juvenile defendants and their families
U.S. Newspaper: to general readership
JUDGMENT
British Television: withhold broadcasting
source
http://74.125.153.132/search?q=cache:jxnjZxD85woJ:myweb.arbor.edu/rwoods/Media_Ethics7/intro.htm.ppt+decision+making+model+potter+box&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=my&client=firefox-a
U.S. Newspaper: publish names and details
Two ten-year-olds go to trial for kidnapping and brutally murdering two-year-old Jason Bugler
VALUES
British Television: honor the court restrictions against reporting juvenile names
U.S. Newspaper: do not suppress public information
PRINCIPLE
British Television: other-regarding care
U.S. Newspaper: truthtelling is categorical imperative
LOYALTIES
British Television: to juvenile defendants and their families
U.S. Newspaper: to general readership
JUDGMENT
British Television: withhold broadcasting
source
http://74.125.153.132/search?q=cache:jxnjZxD85woJ:myweb.arbor.edu/rwoods/Media_Ethics7/intro.htm.ppt+decision+making+model+potter+box&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=my&client=firefox-a
U.S. Newspaper: publish names and details
Beyond the Veil of Ignorance
John Rawls proposed a method, which he called the veil of ignorance, for determining which social customs were just and which were unjust. The veil of ignorance criterion is as follows: a rule is just if everyone would agree to it given that they were made ignorant of their position in society. That is, the just society would be chosen by people who had set aside considerations of their own gender, wealth, race, parentage, ect. Ideally this rule eliminates personal bias from the choice and thus guarantees the fairness of rules.
However, even behind the veil of ignorance there will not be consensus as to which rules are best, throwing into question the assumption that the veil of ignorance would reveal the unique best set of rules, which is one of the reasons Rawls seem to favor it. For example consider two possible societies, one in which the men are rich and the woman are poor, and another in which everyone is moderately wealthy. Even without knowing their gender some people would prefer the unequal society. This is because individuals have different tolerances to risk. Some would consider the chance to be rich worth the risk of being poor, while others would prefer the security of the society that makes everyone equally wealthy. Likewise preferences such as the health of the environment under such a society could interfere with the consensus.
One might suppose that we could fix this problem by asking that people behind the veil be ignorant of their preferences, which would include their tolerance for risk, as well as their social position. However once preferences are discarded it is meaningless to ask people to make a choice. For example consider two possible rules. Rule one is that people must walk to destinations within a mile, and rule two is that people must drive to all destinations. Rule one is safer and friendlier to the environment, while rule two is more efficient. Without preferences however those behind the veil have no reason to pick either of these rules, and so the idea of them being able to decide on any society seems impossible, after all we have even asked them to give up preferences such as “I want to be happy”.
There is a way to achieve the same basic result of the veil of ignorance without making people put aside their preferences. I call it the cut-first-choose-last rule, because it is based on the method for forcing children to divide dessert among each other fairly; the person who cuts the dessert into pieces gets to choose their piece last. When we apply this idea to picking societies we would say that a just society is one which a rational person would create even if they got to pick the position they were born into last. This implies that societies in which men are wealthy and women are poor are unjust, because no one would rationally choose such a society under the proposed rule, for if they did the first people to pick their roles in society would choose to be men, and by the time the designer was to pick their role they would be forced to be improvised.
From the veil of ignorance argument John Rawls concluded that just societies are those in which everyone has equal opportunities, except where unequal opportunities benefit everyone. This principle still holds under the cut-first-choose-last rule. For example consider a society of 4 people where the wealth is distributed in this fashion: $10, $10, $10, $10, and one in which the wealth is distributed in this fashion: $20, $11, $11, $11. The rational person would still choose the second society, which Rawls would consider just, because even though they know that they won’t receive the $20 role they would rather have $11 than $10.
There as still some oddities even with the cut-first-choose-last rule that arise because of different preferences, not towards risk, but towards what is valued. For example some might pick a society in which wealth is distributed as: $9, $9, $9, $9 if the environment was healthier, while others care less about the environment and would simply pick the society that made them richer. John Rawls conclusions are also impacted by this fact, because he argued that from the veil of ignorance that a just society is one in which there was maximal liberty. Because of the variation of preferences however the cut-first-choose-last rule does not yield this result, for the preference for liberty is not universal, some may very well prefer a society in which they are more secure.
I do not believe that this lack of a consensus is failure of the cut-first-choose-last rule; it simply shows that there are a wide variety of societies which are maximally just. One would have to choose among these societies using other criteria, not those of justice or fairness.
source
http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/05/05/beyond-the-veil-of-ignorance/
However, even behind the veil of ignorance there will not be consensus as to which rules are best, throwing into question the assumption that the veil of ignorance would reveal the unique best set of rules, which is one of the reasons Rawls seem to favor it. For example consider two possible societies, one in which the men are rich and the woman are poor, and another in which everyone is moderately wealthy. Even without knowing their gender some people would prefer the unequal society. This is because individuals have different tolerances to risk. Some would consider the chance to be rich worth the risk of being poor, while others would prefer the security of the society that makes everyone equally wealthy. Likewise preferences such as the health of the environment under such a society could interfere with the consensus.
One might suppose that we could fix this problem by asking that people behind the veil be ignorant of their preferences, which would include their tolerance for risk, as well as their social position. However once preferences are discarded it is meaningless to ask people to make a choice. For example consider two possible rules. Rule one is that people must walk to destinations within a mile, and rule two is that people must drive to all destinations. Rule one is safer and friendlier to the environment, while rule two is more efficient. Without preferences however those behind the veil have no reason to pick either of these rules, and so the idea of them being able to decide on any society seems impossible, after all we have even asked them to give up preferences such as “I want to be happy”.
There is a way to achieve the same basic result of the veil of ignorance without making people put aside their preferences. I call it the cut-first-choose-last rule, because it is based on the method for forcing children to divide dessert among each other fairly; the person who cuts the dessert into pieces gets to choose their piece last. When we apply this idea to picking societies we would say that a just society is one which a rational person would create even if they got to pick the position they were born into last. This implies that societies in which men are wealthy and women are poor are unjust, because no one would rationally choose such a society under the proposed rule, for if they did the first people to pick their roles in society would choose to be men, and by the time the designer was to pick their role they would be forced to be improvised.
From the veil of ignorance argument John Rawls concluded that just societies are those in which everyone has equal opportunities, except where unequal opportunities benefit everyone. This principle still holds under the cut-first-choose-last rule. For example consider a society of 4 people where the wealth is distributed in this fashion: $10, $10, $10, $10, and one in which the wealth is distributed in this fashion: $20, $11, $11, $11. The rational person would still choose the second society, which Rawls would consider just, because even though they know that they won’t receive the $20 role they would rather have $11 than $10.
There as still some oddities even with the cut-first-choose-last rule that arise because of different preferences, not towards risk, but towards what is valued. For example some might pick a society in which wealth is distributed as: $9, $9, $9, $9 if the environment was healthier, while others care less about the environment and would simply pick the society that made them richer. John Rawls conclusions are also impacted by this fact, because he argued that from the veil of ignorance that a just society is one in which there was maximal liberty. Because of the variation of preferences however the cut-first-choose-last rule does not yield this result, for the preference for liberty is not universal, some may very well prefer a society in which they are more secure.
I do not believe that this lack of a consensus is failure of the cut-first-choose-last rule; it simply shows that there are a wide variety of societies which are maximally just. One would have to choose among these societies using other criteria, not those of justice or fairness.
source
http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/05/05/beyond-the-veil-of-ignorance/
Aristotle's Golden Mean Classic Moral Theory from the Nicomachean Ethics Read more: "Aristotle's Golden Mean: Classic Moral Theory from the Nicomache
The theory of the mean is one of Aristotle's best-known pieces of ethical thinking. It can be found in his book The Nicomachean Ethics. It is at once strikingly simple and fiendishly difficult. In a nutshell, Aristotle said that virtues are a point of moderation between two opposite vices. For instance, the virtue courage lies between the two vices of cowardice and recklessness. Recklessness is too much confidence and not enough fear, cowardice is too much fear and not enough confidence, courage is just the right amount of both.
This can be expanded to most virtues and vices. Some other means that Aristotle laid out were temperance (or self-control), which lies between self-indulgence and a lack of sensitivity to your own needs, and modesty which is between bashfulness and vanity.
Pre-Christian Virtues
Some of the “virtues” may seem a bit odd to those brought up with a post-Christian worldview. Aristotle thinks you should have the “right amount” of pride, depending on your worth, and that humility is a deficiency of proper pride, and therefore a vice. He also thinks you should feel anger to the right extent – too little anger when someone dents your car and you don't have a proper respect for either your possessions or your own dignity.
As you may have noticed, the mean is about the proper emotional response to situations, rather than the proper actions. For Aristotle, virtue came from character. It is the character that makes you do the good deeds that is virtuous, not the deeds themselves. This school of moral thought is still around today and is called Virtue Ethics.
How to Find the Mean
There are some problems to get over if you're thinking of living your life according to the Golden Mean, however. Firstly, how do you find the mean? Aristotle makes it clear that he is not talking about a mathematical middle, but the perfect intermediate point with regard to ourselves. To adapt an example Aristotle gives, if a baby only needs a teacupful of food each day to thrive, and a fully grown adult needs three square meals, that doesn't mean the ideal amount is halfway in between. If you're old enough to be reading this, you probably need an amount a lot closer to the three square meals than the teacup.
source
http://western-philosophy.suite101.com/article.cfm/aristotles_golden_mean#ixzz0GgK79GOd&A
This can be expanded to most virtues and vices. Some other means that Aristotle laid out were temperance (or self-control), which lies between self-indulgence and a lack of sensitivity to your own needs, and modesty which is between bashfulness and vanity.
Pre-Christian Virtues
Some of the “virtues” may seem a bit odd to those brought up with a post-Christian worldview. Aristotle thinks you should have the “right amount” of pride, depending on your worth, and that humility is a deficiency of proper pride, and therefore a vice. He also thinks you should feel anger to the right extent – too little anger when someone dents your car and you don't have a proper respect for either your possessions or your own dignity.
As you may have noticed, the mean is about the proper emotional response to situations, rather than the proper actions. For Aristotle, virtue came from character. It is the character that makes you do the good deeds that is virtuous, not the deeds themselves. This school of moral thought is still around today and is called Virtue Ethics.
How to Find the Mean
There are some problems to get over if you're thinking of living your life according to the Golden Mean, however. Firstly, how do you find the mean? Aristotle makes it clear that he is not talking about a mathematical middle, but the perfect intermediate point with regard to ourselves. To adapt an example Aristotle gives, if a baby only needs a teacupful of food each day to thrive, and a fully grown adult needs three square meals, that doesn't mean the ideal amount is halfway in between. If you're old enough to be reading this, you probably need an amount a lot closer to the three square meals than the teacup.
source
http://western-philosophy.suite101.com/article.cfm/aristotles_golden_mean#ixzz0GgK79GOd&A
Sunday, July 27, 2008
What is Game Theory
What economists call game theory psychologists call the theory of social situations, which is an accurate description of what game theory is about. Although game theory is relevant to parlor games such as poker or bridge, most research in game theory focuses on how groups of people interact. There are two main branches of game theory: cooperative and noncooperative game theory. Noncooperative game theory deals largely with how intelligent individuals interact with one another in an effort to achieve their own goals. That is the branch of game theory I will discuss here.
In addition to game theory, economic theory has three other main branches: decision theory, general equilibrium theory and mechanism design theory. All are closely connected to game theory.
Decision theory can be viewed as a theory of one person games, or a game of a single player against nature. The focus is on preferences and the formation of beliefs. The most widely used form of decision theory argues that preferences among risky alternatives can be described by the maximization the expected value of a numerical utility function, where utility may depend on a number of things, but in situations of interest to economists often depends on money income. Probability theory is heavily used in order to represent the uncertainty of outcomes, and Bayes Law is frequently used to model the way in which new information is used to revise beliefs. Decision theory is often used in the form of decision analysis, which shows how best to acquire information before making a decision.
General equilibrium theory can be viewed as a specialized branch of game theory that deals with trade and production, and typically with a relatively large number of individual consumers and producers. It is widely used in the macroeconomic analysis of broad based economic policies such as monetary or tax policy, in finance to analyze stock markets, to study interest and exchange rates and other prices. In recent years, political economy has emerged as a combination of general equilibrium theory and game theory in which the private sector of the economy is modeled by general equilibrium theory, while voting behavior and the incentive of governments is analyzed using game theory. Issues studied include tax policy, trade policy, and the role of international trade agreements such as the European Union.
Mechanism design theory differs from game theory in that game theory takes the rules of the game as given, while mechanism design theory asks about the consequences of different types of rules. Naturally this relies heavily on game theory. Questions addressed by mechanism design theory include the design of compensation and wage agreements that effectively spread risk while maintaining incentives, and the design of auctions to maximize revenue, or achieve other goals.
An Instructive Example
One way to describe a game is by listing the players (or individuals) participating in the game, and for each player, listing the alternative choices (called actions or strategies) available to that player. In the case of a two-player game, the actions of the first player form the rows, and the actions of the second player the columns, of a matrix. The entries in the matrix are two numbers representing the utility or payoff to the first and second player respectively. A very famous game is the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In this game the two players are partners in a crime who have been captured by the police. Each suspect is placed in a separate cell, and offered the opportunity to confess to the crime. The game can be represented by the following matrix of payoffs
not confess confess
not confess 5,5 0,10
confess 10,0 1,1
Note that higher numbers are better (more utility). If neither suspect confesses, they go free, and split the proceeds of their crime which we represent by 5 units of utility for each suspect. However, if one prisoner confesses and the other does not, the prisoner who confesses testifies against the other in exchange for going free and gets the entire 10 units of utility, while the prisoner who did not confess goes to prison and gets nothing. If both prisoners confess, then both are given a reduced term, but both are convicted, which we represent by giving each 1 unit of utility: better than having the other prisoner confess, but not so good as going free.
This game has fascinated game theorists for a variety of reasons. First, it is a simple representation of a variety of important situations. For example, instead of confess/not confess we could label the strategies "contribute to the common good" or "behave selfishly." This captures a variety of situations economists describe as public goods problems. An example is the construction of a bridge. It is best for everyone if the bridge is built, but best for each individual if someone else builds the bridge. This is sometimes refered to in economics as an externality. Similarly this game could describe the alternative of two firms competing in the same market, and instead of confess/not confess we could label the strategies "set a high price" and "set a low price." Naturally is is best for both firms if they both set high prices, but best for each individual firm to set a low price while the opposition sets a high price.
A second feature of this game, is that it is self-evident how an intelligent individual should behave. No matter what a suspect believes his partner is going to do, is is always best to confess. If the partner in the other cell is not confessing, it is possible to get 10 instead of 5. If the partner in the other cell is confessing, it is possible to get 1 instead of 0. Yet the pursuit of individually sensible behavior results in each player getting only 1 unit of utility, much less than the 5 units each that they would get if neither confessed. This conflict between the pursuit of individual goals and the common good is at the heart of many game theoretic problems.
A third feature of this game is that it changes in a very significant way if the game is repeated, or if the players will interact with each other again in the future. Suppose for example that after this game is over, and the suspects either are freed or are released from jail they will commit another crime and the game will be played again. In this case in the first period the suspects may reason that they should not confess because if they do not their partner will not confess in the second game. Strictly speaking, this conclusion is not valid, since in the second game both suspects will confess no matter what happened in the first game. However, repetition opens up the possibility of being rewarded or punished in the future for current behavior, and game theorists have provided a number of theories to explain the obvious intuition that if the game is repeated often enough, the suspects ought to cooperate.
In addition to game theory, economic theory has three other main branches: decision theory, general equilibrium theory and mechanism design theory. All are closely connected to game theory.
Decision theory can be viewed as a theory of one person games, or a game of a single player against nature. The focus is on preferences and the formation of beliefs. The most widely used form of decision theory argues that preferences among risky alternatives can be described by the maximization the expected value of a numerical utility function, where utility may depend on a number of things, but in situations of interest to economists often depends on money income. Probability theory is heavily used in order to represent the uncertainty of outcomes, and Bayes Law is frequently used to model the way in which new information is used to revise beliefs. Decision theory is often used in the form of decision analysis, which shows how best to acquire information before making a decision.
General equilibrium theory can be viewed as a specialized branch of game theory that deals with trade and production, and typically with a relatively large number of individual consumers and producers. It is widely used in the macroeconomic analysis of broad based economic policies such as monetary or tax policy, in finance to analyze stock markets, to study interest and exchange rates and other prices. In recent years, political economy has emerged as a combination of general equilibrium theory and game theory in which the private sector of the economy is modeled by general equilibrium theory, while voting behavior and the incentive of governments is analyzed using game theory. Issues studied include tax policy, trade policy, and the role of international trade agreements such as the European Union.
Mechanism design theory differs from game theory in that game theory takes the rules of the game as given, while mechanism design theory asks about the consequences of different types of rules. Naturally this relies heavily on game theory. Questions addressed by mechanism design theory include the design of compensation and wage agreements that effectively spread risk while maintaining incentives, and the design of auctions to maximize revenue, or achieve other goals.
An Instructive Example
One way to describe a game is by listing the players (or individuals) participating in the game, and for each player, listing the alternative choices (called actions or strategies) available to that player. In the case of a two-player game, the actions of the first player form the rows, and the actions of the second player the columns, of a matrix. The entries in the matrix are two numbers representing the utility or payoff to the first and second player respectively. A very famous game is the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In this game the two players are partners in a crime who have been captured by the police. Each suspect is placed in a separate cell, and offered the opportunity to confess to the crime. The game can be represented by the following matrix of payoffs
not confess confess
not confess 5,5 0,10
confess 10,0 1,1
Note that higher numbers are better (more utility). If neither suspect confesses, they go free, and split the proceeds of their crime which we represent by 5 units of utility for each suspect. However, if one prisoner confesses and the other does not, the prisoner who confesses testifies against the other in exchange for going free and gets the entire 10 units of utility, while the prisoner who did not confess goes to prison and gets nothing. If both prisoners confess, then both are given a reduced term, but both are convicted, which we represent by giving each 1 unit of utility: better than having the other prisoner confess, but not so good as going free.
This game has fascinated game theorists for a variety of reasons. First, it is a simple representation of a variety of important situations. For example, instead of confess/not confess we could label the strategies "contribute to the common good" or "behave selfishly." This captures a variety of situations economists describe as public goods problems. An example is the construction of a bridge. It is best for everyone if the bridge is built, but best for each individual if someone else builds the bridge. This is sometimes refered to in economics as an externality. Similarly this game could describe the alternative of two firms competing in the same market, and instead of confess/not confess we could label the strategies "set a high price" and "set a low price." Naturally is is best for both firms if they both set high prices, but best for each individual firm to set a low price while the opposition sets a high price.
A second feature of this game, is that it is self-evident how an intelligent individual should behave. No matter what a suspect believes his partner is going to do, is is always best to confess. If the partner in the other cell is not confessing, it is possible to get 10 instead of 5. If the partner in the other cell is confessing, it is possible to get 1 instead of 0. Yet the pursuit of individually sensible behavior results in each player getting only 1 unit of utility, much less than the 5 units each that they would get if neither confessed. This conflict between the pursuit of individual goals and the common good is at the heart of many game theoretic problems.
A third feature of this game is that it changes in a very significant way if the game is repeated, or if the players will interact with each other again in the future. Suppose for example that after this game is over, and the suspects either are freed or are released from jail they will commit another crime and the game will be played again. In this case in the first period the suspects may reason that they should not confess because if they do not their partner will not confess in the second game. Strictly speaking, this conclusion is not valid, since in the second game both suspects will confess no matter what happened in the first game. However, repetition opens up the possibility of being rewarded or punished in the future for current behavior, and game theorists have provided a number of theories to explain the obvious intuition that if the game is repeated often enough, the suspects ought to cooperate.
Saturday, July 5, 2008
Boas on the Limitations of the Comparative Method-cultural relativism by Franz Boas
This is one of Franz Boas's finest theoretical statements. It not only provides a valuable critique of the method characteristic of late 19th century evolutionary anthropology (which you have seen in use by, eg, Tylor and Morgan), but it also gives an accurate description of the general strategy which Boas and his students followed in their ethnographic work. Beyond that, it has the great virtue of being clearly and simply written. The essay was originally published in 1896 in Science (new series) 4: 901-8; but I have inserted the pagination of the more commonly referenced reprint, which appeared in Boas's own collection from among his articles: Race, Language and Culture, which was published in 1940 (New York: The Free Press). The single citation (to Andree) is omitted.
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE COMPARATIVE
METHOD OF ANTHROPOLOGY
Modern anthropology has discovered the fact that human society has grown and developed everywhere in such a manner that its forms, its opinions and its actions have many fundamental traits in common. This momentous discovery implies that laws exist which govern the development of society, that they are applicable to our society as well as to those of past times and of distant lands; that their knowledge will be a means of understanding the causes furthering and retarding civilization; and that, guided by this knowledge, we may hope to govern our actions so that the greatest benefit to mankind will accrue from them. Since this discovery has been clearly formulated, anthropology has begun to receive that liberal share of public interest which was withheld from it as long as it was believed that it could do no more than record the curious customs and beliefs of strange peoples; or, at best, trace their relationships, and thus elucidate the early migrations of the races of man and the affinities of peoples.
While early investigators concentrated their attention upon this purely historical problem, the tide has now completely turned, so that there are even anthropologists who declare that such investigations belong to the historian, and that anthropological studies must be confined to researches on the laws that govern the growth of society.
A radical change of method has accompanied this change of views. While formerly identities or similarities of culture were considered incontrovertible proof of historical connection, or even of common origin, the new school declines to consider them as such, but interprets them as results of the uniform working of the human mind. The most pronounced adherent of this view in our country is Dr. D. G. Brinton, in Germany the majority of the followers of Bastian, who in this respect go much farther than Bastian himself. Others, while not denying the occurrence of historical connections, regard them as insignificant in re-
271
This modern view is founded on the observation that the same ethnical phenomena occur among the most diverse peoples, or, as Bastian says, on the appalling monotony of the fundamental ideas of mankind all over the globe. The metaphysical notions of man may be reduced to a few types which are of universal distribution; the same is the case in regard to the forms of society, laws and inventions. Furthermore, the most intricate and apparently illogical ideas and the most curious and complex customs appear among a few tribes here and there in such a manner that the assumption of a common historical origin is excluded. When studying the culture of any one tribe, more or less close analoga of single traits of such a culture may be found among a great diversity of peoples. Instances of such analoga have been collected to a vast extent by Tylor, Spencer, Bastian, Andree, Post and many others, so that it is not necessary to give here any detailed proof of this fact. The idea of a future life; the one underlying shamanism; inventions such as fire and the bow; certain elementary features of grammatical structure -these will suggest the classes of phenomena to which I refer. It follows from these observations that when we find analogous single traits of culture among distant peoples, the presumption is not that there has been a common historical source, but that they have arisen independently.
But the discovery of these universal ideas is only the beginning of the work of the anthropologist. Scientific inquiry must answer two questions in regard to them: First, what is their origin? and second, how do they assert themselves in various cultures?
The second question is the easier one to answer. The ideas do not exist everywhere in identical form, but they vary. Sufficient material has been accumulated to show that the causes of these variations are either external, that is founded on environment -taking the term environment in its widest sense- or internal, that is founded on psychological conditions. The influence of external and internal factors upon elementary ideas embodies one group of laws governing the growth of culture. Therefore, our endeavors must be directed to showing how such factors modify elementary ideas
The first method that suggests itself and which has been generally adopted by modern anthropologists is to isolate and classify causes by grouping the variants of certain ethnological phenomena according to
272
By this method we begin to recognize even now with imperfect knowledge of the facts what causes may have been at work in shaping the culture of mankind. Friedrich Ratzel and W J McGee have investigated the influence of geographical environment on a broader basis of facts than Ritter and Guyot were able to do at their time. Sociologists have made important studies on the effects of the density of population and of other simple social causes. Thus the influence of external factors upon the growth of society is becoming clearer.
The effects of psychical factors are also being studied in the same manner. Stoll has tried to isolate the phenomena of suggestion and of hypnotism and to study the effects of their presence in the cultures of various peoples. Inquiries into the mutual relations of tribes and peoples begin to show that certain cultural elements are easily assimilated while others are rejected, and the time-worn phrases of the imposition of culture by a more highly civilized people upon one of lower culture that has been conquered are giving way to more thorough views on the subject of exchange of cultural achievements. In all these investigations we are using sound inductive methods in order to isolate the causes of observed phenomena.
The other question in regard to the universal ideas, namely that of their origin, is much more difficult to treat. Many attempts have been made to discover the causes which have led to the formation of ideas 'that develop with iron necessity wherever man lives.' This is the most difficult problem of anthropology and we may expect that it will baffle our attempts for a long time to come. Bastian denies that it is possible to discover the ultimate sources of inventions, ideas, customs and beliefs which are of universal occurrence. They may be indigenous, they may be imported, they may have arisen from a variety of sources, but they are there. The human mind is so formed that it invents them spontaneously or accepts them whenever they are offered to it. This is the much misunderstood elementary idea of Bastian.
To a certain extent the clear enunciation of the elementary idea gives us the psychological reason for its existence. To exemplify: the fact that the land of the shadows is so often placed in the west suggests the endeavor to localize it at the place where the sun and the stars vanish.
273
In treating this, the most difficult problem of anthropology, the point of view is taken that if an ethnological phenomenon has developed independently in a number of places its development has been the same everywhere; or, expressed in a different form, that the same ethnological phenomena are always due to the same causes. This leads to the still wider generalization that the sameness of ethnological phenomena found in diverse regions is proof that the human mind obeys the same laws everywhere. It is obvious that if different historical developments could lead to the same results, that then this generalization would not be tenable. Their existence would present to us an entirely different problem, namely, how it is that the developments of culture so often lead to the same results. It must, therefore, be clearly understood that anthropological research which compares similar cultural phenomena from various parts of the world, in order to discover the uniform history of their development, makes the assumption that the same ethnological phenomenon has everywhere developed in the same manner. Here lies the flaw in the argument of the new method, for no such proof can be given. Even the most cursory review shows that the same phenomena may develop in a multitude of ways.
I will give a few examples: Primitive tribes are almost universally divided into clans which have totems. There can be no doubt that this form of social organization has arisen independently over and over
274
To give another example: Recent investigations have shown that geometrical designs in primitive art have originated sometimes from naturalistic forms which were gradually conventionalized, sometimes from technical motives, that in still other cases they were geometrical by origin or that they were derived from symbols. From all these sources the same forms have developed. Out of designs representing diverse objects grew in course of time frets, meanders, crosses and the like. Therefore the frequent occurrence of these forms proves neither common origin nor that they have always developed according to the same psychical laws. On the contrary, the identical result may have been reached on four different lines of development and from an infinite number of starting points.
Another example may not be amiss: The use of masks is found among a great number of peoples. The origin of the custom of wearing masks is by no means clear in all cases, but a few typical forms of their use may easily be distinguished. They are used for deceiving spirits as to the identity of the wearer. The spirit of a disease who intends to attack the person does not recognize him when he wears a mask, and the mask serves in this manner as a protection. In other cases the mask represents a spirit which is personified by the wearer, who in this shape frightens away other hostile spirits. Still other masks are commemorative. The wearer personifies a deceased person whose memory is to be recalled. Masks are also used in theatrical performances illustrating mythological incidents.
These few data suffice to show that the same ethnical phenomenon
275
Thus we recognize that the fundamental assumption which is so often made by modern anthropologists cannot be accepted as true in all cases. We cannot say that the occurrence of the same phenomenon is always due to the same causes, and that thus it is proved that the human mind obeys the same laws everywhere. We must demand that the causes from which it developed be investigated and that comparisons be restricted to those phenomena which have been proved to be effects of the same causes. We must insist that this investigation be made a preliminary to all extended comparative studies. In researches on tribal societies those which have developed through association must be treated separately from those that have developed through disintegration. Geometrical designs which have arisen from conventionalized representations of natural objects must be treated separately from those that have arisen from technical motives. In short, before extended comparisons are made, the comparability of the material must be proved.
The comparative studies of which I am speaking here attempt to explain customs and ideas of remarkable similarity which are found here and there. But they pursue also the more ambitious scheme of discovering the laws and the history of the evolution of human society. The fact that many fundamental features of culture are universal, or at least occur in many isolated places, interpreted by the assumption that the same features must always have developed from the same causes, leads to the conclusion that there is one grand system according to which mankind has developed everywhere; that all the occurring variations are no more than minor details in this grand uniform evolution. It is clear that this theory has for its logical basis the assumption that the same phenomena are always due to the same causes. To give an instance: We find many types of structure of family. It can he proved that paternal families have often developed from maternal ones. Therefore, it is said, all paternal families have developed from maternal ones. If we do not make the assumption that the same phenomena have everywhere developed from the same causes, then we may just as well conclude that paternal families have in some cases arisen from maternal institutions; in other cases in other ways. To give another example: Many conceptions of the future life have evidently developed from dreams and hallucinations. Consequently, it is said, all notions of this
276
We have seen that the facts do not favor at all the assumption of which we are speaking; that they much rather point in the opposite direction. Therefore we must also consider all the ingenious attempts at constructions of a grand system of the evolution of society as of very doubtful value, unless at the same time proof is given that the same phenomena must always have had the same origin. Until this is done, the presumption is always in favor of a variety of courses which historical growth may have taken.
It will be well to restate at this place one of the principal aims of anthropological research. We agreed that certain laws exist which govern the growth of human culture, and it is our endeavor to discover these laws. The object of our investigation is to find the processes by which certain stages of culture have developed. The customs and beliefs themselves are not the ultimate objects of research. We desire to learn the reasons why such customs and beliefs exist -in other words, we wish to discover the history of their development. The method which is at present most frequently applied in investigations of this character compares the variations under which the customs or beliefs occur and endeavors to find the common psychological cause that underlies all of them. I have stated that this method is open to a very fundamental objection.
We have another method, which in many respects is much safer. A detailed study of customs in their relation to the total culture of the tribe practicing them, in connection with an investigation of their geographical distribution among neighboring tribes, affords us almost always a means of determining with considerable accuracy the historical causes that led to the formation of the customs in question and to the psychological processes that were at work in their development. The results of inquiries conducted by this method may be three-fold. They may reveal the environmental conditions which have created or modified cultural elements; they may clear up psychological factors which are at work in shaping the culture; or they may bring before our eyes the effects that historical connections have had upon the growth of the culture.
We have in this method a means of reconstructing the history of the growth of ideas with much greater accuracy than the generalizations of the comparative method will permit. The latter must always
277
278
It seems necessary to say a word here in regard to an objection to my arguments that will be raised by investigators who claim that similarity of geographical environment is a sufficient cause for similarity of culture, that is to say, that, for instance, the geographical conditions of the plains of the Mississippi basin necessitate the development of a certain culture. Horatio Hale would even go so far as to believe that similarity of form of language may be due to environmental causes. Environment has a certain limited effect upon the culture of man, but I do not see how the view that it is the primary moulder of culture can be supported by any facts. A hasty review of the tribes and peoples of our globe shows that people most diverse in culture and language live under the same geographical conditions, as proof of which may be mentioned the ethnography of East Africa or of New Guinea. In both these regions we find a great diversity of customs in small areas. But much more important is this: Not one observed fact can be brought forward in support of this hypothesis which cannot be much better explained by the well known facts of diffusion of culture; for archaeology as well as ethnography teach us that intercourse between neighboring tribes has always existed and has extended over enormous areas. In the Old World the products of the Baltic found their way to the Mediterranean and the works of art of the eastern Mediterranean reached Sweden. In America the shells of the ocean found their way into the innermost parts of the continent and the obsidians of the West were carried to Ohio. Intermarriages, war, slavery, trade, have been so many sources of constant introduction of foreign cultural elements, so that an assimilation of culture must have taken place over continuous areas. Therefore, it seems to my mind that where among neighboring tribes an immediate influence of environment cannot be shown to exist, the presumption must always be in favor of historical connection. There has been a time of isolation during which the principal traits of diverse cultures developed according to the previous culture and the environment of the tribes. But the stages of culture representing this period have been covered with so much that is new and that is due to contact with foreign tribes that they cannot be discovered without the most painstaking isolation of foreign elements.
The immediate results of the historical method are, therefore, histories of the cultures of diverse tribes which have been the subject of
279
The historical inquiry must be considered the critical test that science must require before admitting facts as evidence. By its means the comparability of the collected material must be tested, and uniformity of processes must be demanded as proof of comparability. Furthermore, when historical connection between two phenomena can be proved, they must not be admitted as independent evidence.
In a few cases the immediate results of this method are of so wide a scope that they rank with the best results that can be attained by comparative studies. Some phenomena have so immense a distribution that the discovery of their occurrence over very large continuous areas proves at once that certain phases of the culture in these areas have sprung from one source. Thus are illuminated vast portions of the early history of mankind. When Edward S. Morse showed that certain methods of arrow release are peculiar to whole continents it became clear at once that the common practice found over a vast area must have had a common origin. When the Polynesians employ a method of fire making consisting in rubbing a stick along a groove, while almost all other peoples use the fire drill, it shows their art of fire making has a single origin. When we notice that the ordeal is found all over Africa in certain peculiar forms, while in those parts of the inhabited world that are remote from Africa it is found not at all or in rudimentary forms only, it shows that the idea as practiced in Africa had one single origin.
The great and important function of the historical method of an-
280
Thus we have seen that the comparative method can hope to reach the results for which it is striving only when it bases its investigations on the historical results of researches which are devoted to laying clear the complex relations of each individual culture. The comparative method and the historical method if I may use these terms, have been struggling for supremacy for a long time, but we hope that each will soon find its appropriate place and function. The historical method has reached a sounder basis by abandoning the misleading principle of assuming connections wherever similarities of culture were found. The comparative method, notwithstanding all that has been said and written in its praise, has been remarkably barren of definite results, and I believe it will not become fruitful until we renounce the vain endeavor to construct a uniform systematic history of the evolution of culture, and until we begin to make our comparisons on the broader and sounder basis which I ventured to outline. Up to this time we have too much reveled in more or less ingenious vagaries. The solid work is still all before us.
reference source
http://www.anthrobase.com/Browse/home/hst/cache/bocomp.html
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE COMPARATIVE
METHOD OF ANTHROPOLOGY
Modern anthropology has discovered the fact that human society has grown and developed everywhere in such a manner that its forms, its opinions and its actions have many fundamental traits in common. This momentous discovery implies that laws exist which govern the development of society, that they are applicable to our society as well as to those of past times and of distant lands; that their knowledge will be a means of understanding the causes furthering and retarding civilization; and that, guided by this knowledge, we may hope to govern our actions so that the greatest benefit to mankind will accrue from them. Since this discovery has been clearly formulated, anthropology has begun to receive that liberal share of public interest which was withheld from it as long as it was believed that it could do no more than record the curious customs and beliefs of strange peoples; or, at best, trace their relationships, and thus elucidate the early migrations of the races of man and the affinities of peoples.
While early investigators concentrated their attention upon this purely historical problem, the tide has now completely turned, so that there are even anthropologists who declare that such investigations belong to the historian, and that anthropological studies must be confined to researches on the laws that govern the growth of society.
A radical change of method has accompanied this change of views. While formerly identities or similarities of culture were considered incontrovertible proof of historical connection, or even of common origin, the new school declines to consider them as such, but interprets them as results of the uniform working of the human mind. The most pronounced adherent of this view in our country is Dr. D. G. Brinton, in Germany the majority of the followers of Bastian, who in this respect go much farther than Bastian himself. Others, while not denying the occurrence of historical connections, regard them as insignificant in re-
271
This modern view is founded on the observation that the same ethnical phenomena occur among the most diverse peoples, or, as Bastian says, on the appalling monotony of the fundamental ideas of mankind all over the globe. The metaphysical notions of man may be reduced to a few types which are of universal distribution; the same is the case in regard to the forms of society, laws and inventions. Furthermore, the most intricate and apparently illogical ideas and the most curious and complex customs appear among a few tribes here and there in such a manner that the assumption of a common historical origin is excluded. When studying the culture of any one tribe, more or less close analoga of single traits of such a culture may be found among a great diversity of peoples. Instances of such analoga have been collected to a vast extent by Tylor, Spencer, Bastian, Andree, Post and many others, so that it is not necessary to give here any detailed proof of this fact. The idea of a future life; the one underlying shamanism; inventions such as fire and the bow; certain elementary features of grammatical structure -these will suggest the classes of phenomena to which I refer. It follows from these observations that when we find analogous single traits of culture among distant peoples, the presumption is not that there has been a common historical source, but that they have arisen independently.
But the discovery of these universal ideas is only the beginning of the work of the anthropologist. Scientific inquiry must answer two questions in regard to them: First, what is their origin? and second, how do they assert themselves in various cultures?
The second question is the easier one to answer. The ideas do not exist everywhere in identical form, but they vary. Sufficient material has been accumulated to show that the causes of these variations are either external, that is founded on environment -taking the term environment in its widest sense- or internal, that is founded on psychological conditions. The influence of external and internal factors upon elementary ideas embodies one group of laws governing the growth of culture. Therefore, our endeavors must be directed to showing how such factors modify elementary ideas
The first method that suggests itself and which has been generally adopted by modern anthropologists is to isolate and classify causes by grouping the variants of certain ethnological phenomena according to
272
By this method we begin to recognize even now with imperfect knowledge of the facts what causes may have been at work in shaping the culture of mankind. Friedrich Ratzel and W J McGee have investigated the influence of geographical environment on a broader basis of facts than Ritter and Guyot were able to do at their time. Sociologists have made important studies on the effects of the density of population and of other simple social causes. Thus the influence of external factors upon the growth of society is becoming clearer.
The effects of psychical factors are also being studied in the same manner. Stoll has tried to isolate the phenomena of suggestion and of hypnotism and to study the effects of their presence in the cultures of various peoples. Inquiries into the mutual relations of tribes and peoples begin to show that certain cultural elements are easily assimilated while others are rejected, and the time-worn phrases of the imposition of culture by a more highly civilized people upon one of lower culture that has been conquered are giving way to more thorough views on the subject of exchange of cultural achievements. In all these investigations we are using sound inductive methods in order to isolate the causes of observed phenomena.
The other question in regard to the universal ideas, namely that of their origin, is much more difficult to treat. Many attempts have been made to discover the causes which have led to the formation of ideas 'that develop with iron necessity wherever man lives.' This is the most difficult problem of anthropology and we may expect that it will baffle our attempts for a long time to come. Bastian denies that it is possible to discover the ultimate sources of inventions, ideas, customs and beliefs which are of universal occurrence. They may be indigenous, they may be imported, they may have arisen from a variety of sources, but they are there. The human mind is so formed that it invents them spontaneously or accepts them whenever they are offered to it. This is the much misunderstood elementary idea of Bastian.
To a certain extent the clear enunciation of the elementary idea gives us the psychological reason for its existence. To exemplify: the fact that the land of the shadows is so often placed in the west suggests the endeavor to localize it at the place where the sun and the stars vanish.
273
In treating this, the most difficult problem of anthropology, the point of view is taken that if an ethnological phenomenon has developed independently in a number of places its development has been the same everywhere; or, expressed in a different form, that the same ethnological phenomena are always due to the same causes. This leads to the still wider generalization that the sameness of ethnological phenomena found in diverse regions is proof that the human mind obeys the same laws everywhere. It is obvious that if different historical developments could lead to the same results, that then this generalization would not be tenable. Their existence would present to us an entirely different problem, namely, how it is that the developments of culture so often lead to the same results. It must, therefore, be clearly understood that anthropological research which compares similar cultural phenomena from various parts of the world, in order to discover the uniform history of their development, makes the assumption that the same ethnological phenomenon has everywhere developed in the same manner. Here lies the flaw in the argument of the new method, for no such proof can be given. Even the most cursory review shows that the same phenomena may develop in a multitude of ways.
I will give a few examples: Primitive tribes are almost universally divided into clans which have totems. There can be no doubt that this form of social organization has arisen independently over and over
274
To give another example: Recent investigations have shown that geometrical designs in primitive art have originated sometimes from naturalistic forms which were gradually conventionalized, sometimes from technical motives, that in still other cases they were geometrical by origin or that they were derived from symbols. From all these sources the same forms have developed. Out of designs representing diverse objects grew in course of time frets, meanders, crosses and the like. Therefore the frequent occurrence of these forms proves neither common origin nor that they have always developed according to the same psychical laws. On the contrary, the identical result may have been reached on four different lines of development and from an infinite number of starting points.
Another example may not be amiss: The use of masks is found among a great number of peoples. The origin of the custom of wearing masks is by no means clear in all cases, but a few typical forms of their use may easily be distinguished. They are used for deceiving spirits as to the identity of the wearer. The spirit of a disease who intends to attack the person does not recognize him when he wears a mask, and the mask serves in this manner as a protection. In other cases the mask represents a spirit which is personified by the wearer, who in this shape frightens away other hostile spirits. Still other masks are commemorative. The wearer personifies a deceased person whose memory is to be recalled. Masks are also used in theatrical performances illustrating mythological incidents.
These few data suffice to show that the same ethnical phenomenon
275
Thus we recognize that the fundamental assumption which is so often made by modern anthropologists cannot be accepted as true in all cases. We cannot say that the occurrence of the same phenomenon is always due to the same causes, and that thus it is proved that the human mind obeys the same laws everywhere. We must demand that the causes from which it developed be investigated and that comparisons be restricted to those phenomena which have been proved to be effects of the same causes. We must insist that this investigation be made a preliminary to all extended comparative studies. In researches on tribal societies those which have developed through association must be treated separately from those that have developed through disintegration. Geometrical designs which have arisen from conventionalized representations of natural objects must be treated separately from those that have arisen from technical motives. In short, before extended comparisons are made, the comparability of the material must be proved.
The comparative studies of which I am speaking here attempt to explain customs and ideas of remarkable similarity which are found here and there. But they pursue also the more ambitious scheme of discovering the laws and the history of the evolution of human society. The fact that many fundamental features of culture are universal, or at least occur in many isolated places, interpreted by the assumption that the same features must always have developed from the same causes, leads to the conclusion that there is one grand system according to which mankind has developed everywhere; that all the occurring variations are no more than minor details in this grand uniform evolution. It is clear that this theory has for its logical basis the assumption that the same phenomena are always due to the same causes. To give an instance: We find many types of structure of family. It can he proved that paternal families have often developed from maternal ones. Therefore, it is said, all paternal families have developed from maternal ones. If we do not make the assumption that the same phenomena have everywhere developed from the same causes, then we may just as well conclude that paternal families have in some cases arisen from maternal institutions; in other cases in other ways. To give another example: Many conceptions of the future life have evidently developed from dreams and hallucinations. Consequently, it is said, all notions of this
276
We have seen that the facts do not favor at all the assumption of which we are speaking; that they much rather point in the opposite direction. Therefore we must also consider all the ingenious attempts at constructions of a grand system of the evolution of society as of very doubtful value, unless at the same time proof is given that the same phenomena must always have had the same origin. Until this is done, the presumption is always in favor of a variety of courses which historical growth may have taken.
It will be well to restate at this place one of the principal aims of anthropological research. We agreed that certain laws exist which govern the growth of human culture, and it is our endeavor to discover these laws. The object of our investigation is to find the processes by which certain stages of culture have developed. The customs and beliefs themselves are not the ultimate objects of research. We desire to learn the reasons why such customs and beliefs exist -in other words, we wish to discover the history of their development. The method which is at present most frequently applied in investigations of this character compares the variations under which the customs or beliefs occur and endeavors to find the common psychological cause that underlies all of them. I have stated that this method is open to a very fundamental objection.
We have another method, which in many respects is much safer. A detailed study of customs in their relation to the total culture of the tribe practicing them, in connection with an investigation of their geographical distribution among neighboring tribes, affords us almost always a means of determining with considerable accuracy the historical causes that led to the formation of the customs in question and to the psychological processes that were at work in their development. The results of inquiries conducted by this method may be three-fold. They may reveal the environmental conditions which have created or modified cultural elements; they may clear up psychological factors which are at work in shaping the culture; or they may bring before our eyes the effects that historical connections have had upon the growth of the culture.
We have in this method a means of reconstructing the history of the growth of ideas with much greater accuracy than the generalizations of the comparative method will permit. The latter must always
277
278
It seems necessary to say a word here in regard to an objection to my arguments that will be raised by investigators who claim that similarity of geographical environment is a sufficient cause for similarity of culture, that is to say, that, for instance, the geographical conditions of the plains of the Mississippi basin necessitate the development of a certain culture. Horatio Hale would even go so far as to believe that similarity of form of language may be due to environmental causes. Environment has a certain limited effect upon the culture of man, but I do not see how the view that it is the primary moulder of culture can be supported by any facts. A hasty review of the tribes and peoples of our globe shows that people most diverse in culture and language live under the same geographical conditions, as proof of which may be mentioned the ethnography of East Africa or of New Guinea. In both these regions we find a great diversity of customs in small areas. But much more important is this: Not one observed fact can be brought forward in support of this hypothesis which cannot be much better explained by the well known facts of diffusion of culture; for archaeology as well as ethnography teach us that intercourse between neighboring tribes has always existed and has extended over enormous areas. In the Old World the products of the Baltic found their way to the Mediterranean and the works of art of the eastern Mediterranean reached Sweden. In America the shells of the ocean found their way into the innermost parts of the continent and the obsidians of the West were carried to Ohio. Intermarriages, war, slavery, trade, have been so many sources of constant introduction of foreign cultural elements, so that an assimilation of culture must have taken place over continuous areas. Therefore, it seems to my mind that where among neighboring tribes an immediate influence of environment cannot be shown to exist, the presumption must always be in favor of historical connection. There has been a time of isolation during which the principal traits of diverse cultures developed according to the previous culture and the environment of the tribes. But the stages of culture representing this period have been covered with so much that is new and that is due to contact with foreign tribes that they cannot be discovered without the most painstaking isolation of foreign elements.
The immediate results of the historical method are, therefore, histories of the cultures of diverse tribes which have been the subject of
279
The historical inquiry must be considered the critical test that science must require before admitting facts as evidence. By its means the comparability of the collected material must be tested, and uniformity of processes must be demanded as proof of comparability. Furthermore, when historical connection between two phenomena can be proved, they must not be admitted as independent evidence.
In a few cases the immediate results of this method are of so wide a scope that they rank with the best results that can be attained by comparative studies. Some phenomena have so immense a distribution that the discovery of their occurrence over very large continuous areas proves at once that certain phases of the culture in these areas have sprung from one source. Thus are illuminated vast portions of the early history of mankind. When Edward S. Morse showed that certain methods of arrow release are peculiar to whole continents it became clear at once that the common practice found over a vast area must have had a common origin. When the Polynesians employ a method of fire making consisting in rubbing a stick along a groove, while almost all other peoples use the fire drill, it shows their art of fire making has a single origin. When we notice that the ordeal is found all over Africa in certain peculiar forms, while in those parts of the inhabited world that are remote from Africa it is found not at all or in rudimentary forms only, it shows that the idea as practiced in Africa had one single origin.
The great and important function of the historical method of an-
280
Thus we have seen that the comparative method can hope to reach the results for which it is striving only when it bases its investigations on the historical results of researches which are devoted to laying clear the complex relations of each individual culture. The comparative method and the historical method if I may use these terms, have been struggling for supremacy for a long time, but we hope that each will soon find its appropriate place and function. The historical method has reached a sounder basis by abandoning the misleading principle of assuming connections wherever similarities of culture were found. The comparative method, notwithstanding all that has been said and written in its praise, has been remarkably barren of definite results, and I believe it will not become fruitful until we renounce the vain endeavor to construct a uniform systematic history of the evolution of culture, and until we begin to make our comparisons on the broader and sounder basis which I ventured to outline. Up to this time we have too much reveled in more or less ingenious vagaries. The solid work is still all before us.
reference source
http://www.anthrobase.com/Browse/home/hst/cache/bocomp.html
Elements of Culture---Aka Crash Course for culture
I. Elements of Culture
Introduction: The term “culture” means different things to different people. To some, it is associated with activities. ELITE CULTURE refers to the life style of the wealthy, affluent, or upper classes. POPULAR CULTURE is viewed as the culture, particularly the leisure time, of the common people.
A. A CULTURE is a system of ideas, values, beliefs, knowledge, norms, customs, and technology shared by almost everyone in a particular society. A SOCIETY is a group of people who share a common culture. The existence of culture depends on people’s ability to create and understand SYMBOLS, things that are used to represent something else.
1. SYMBOLS are arbitrary designations that are collective creations; most sociologists believe that the ability to use symbols is uniquely human.
2. Success or failure in many relationships, both personal and professional, often depends upon our ability to communicate symbolically.
B. LANGUAGE, the systematized usage of speech and hearing to convey or express feelings and ideas, is the most important set of symbols.
1. Language is uniquely human and is one of the basic distinctions between human beings and other forms of life, as demonstrated by the comparative studies of infants and chimpanzees.
2. Regular use of words over time and place, and the widespread use of certain words, indicate that language is an integral and universal part of culture. Linguistic symbols are learned and shared just like other cultural traits.
3. In addition to a verbal and written language, every culture develops a “silent language” of gestures, expressions, and mannerisms; knowledge of this nonverbal language can be very useful to those who must deal with people from different cultures.
4. The SAPIR-WHORF HYPOTHESIS suggests that our perceptions of reality and consequent behaviors are significantly influenced by the grammatical forms, labels, and categories provided by our language.
C. VALUES are shared ideas of what is important and worthwhile by the people in a society. Values often are emotionally charged and learned early in life.
1. Most values have both positive and negative counterparts.
2. When basic values conflict with one another, a person may experience guilt or mental stress and attempt to resolve the guilt by pursuing alternative courses of action.
3. Despite the social diversity of the United States, Robin M. Williams (1970) described 15 major value orientations that are shared in our culture, including belief in achievement and success, external conformity, and democracy.
4. Williams states that most conflicts between value systems in the United States occur between values centering around individual personalities and values organized around categorical themes or conceptions. Group discrimination and racism, for example, are contrary to other central values of our society.
5. An understanding of value systems can be useful for many people in their work. The ability to recognize and deal with competing value systems leads to better management.
D. Social NORMS are rules of conduct or social expectations specifying how people should or should not behave in various social situations. Norms are either prescriptive or proscriptive.
1. William G. Sumner identified two types of norms, FOLKWAYS and MORES, and distinguished between them by (1) the degree to which group members are compelled to conform to them, (2) their importance, (3) the severity of punishment if they are violated, and (4) the intensity of feelings associated with adherence to them.
2. FOLKWAYS are learned customs or conventions that are passed down from one generation to the next; violation tends to be punished mildly, if at all.
3. MORES are considered more important than folkways; reactions to their violations are more serious. They tend to involve clear-cut distinctions between right and wrong and are more closely identified with society’s important values. Mores that prohibit something, that state “thou shalt not,” are called TABOOS. To care for one’s child is called a MOS (singular for MORES), while committing incest is a TABOO.
4. LAWS are formal, standardized expressions of norms enacted by legislative bodies to regulate particular types of behaviors. Laws state the punishment for their violation and are enforced by a group designated for that purpose.
5. When a law does not reflect folkways and mores, its enforcement is likely to be ignored or given low priority.
6. Cultural norms are not always beneficial to the society, group, or individual that follows them. Some may actually be harmful in what Erich Fromm calls the “PATHOLOGY OF NORMALCY.”
7. The process of violating norms beyond the range of group acceptability is termed deviance; the process of applying sanctions to obtain social conformity is known as social control.
E. TECHNOLOGY is the practical production and application of material techniques and products to maintain a culture’s standard of living; it includes social customs and practical techniques for converting raw materials into finished products.
1. ARTIFACTS are physical objects that reflect a society’s technology. Artifacts provide clues to a society’s level of technological development, but the presence of more sophisticated technology in one culture as opposed to another culture should not be used as scientific criteria for evaluating the two. It is a mistake to dismiss a culture’s technological system because it appears to be less developed or complex than our own.
F. CULTURAL LAG takes place when changes in technology and material culture occur more rapidly than changes in nonmaterial culture (such as beliefs, values, and laws); cultural lag is inevitable in rapidly changing societies.
II. Interpreting Culture: Our Own and Others
A. Sumner defined ETHNOCENTRISM as “that view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it.” It is the attitude that one’s own culture is superior to others; that one’s own beliefs, values, and behaviors are more correct than others; and that other people and cultures can be evaluated in terms of one’s own culture.
1. Ethnocentrism is particularly strong among people who have had little contact with other cultures; yet ethnocentric attitudes are found among the highly educated and experienced travelers as well.
2. The functions of ethnocentrism include (1) promoting unity, (2) encouraging conformity, (3) reinforcing nationalism, and (4) maintaining the status quo.
3. The dysfunctions of ethnocentrism include (1) increasing resistance to beneficial change, (2) discouraging integration, (3) increasing the likelihood of hostility and conflicts among groups, and (4) preventing beneficial social change.
B. XENOCENTRISM, the opposite of ethnocentrism, is the belief that one’s own lifestyle, products, or ideas are inferior to those of other cultures.
C. TEMPOROCENTRISM is the belief that one’s own time is more important than the past or future. Historical events are judged not in their own context, but rather on the basis of contemporary standards. It is most prevalent among those who lack historical perspective.
D. The belief that cultures must be judged on their own terms is known as CULTURAL RELATIVISM.
1. Cultural relativism means that a behavior appropriate in one place may not be appropriate everywhere.
2. Knowledge of cultural relativism can be useful to anyone who works with people from different cultures.
III. Cultural Complexity and Diversity
Culture is a complex and diverse system of independent factors; its organization is influenced by physical circumstances such as climate, geography, and population. The complexity of a culture can best be understood by examining various units of a culture.
A. SUBCULTURES are groups of people who participate in the larger, dominant culture yet also maintain their own distinctive life styles and set of cultural elements as well.
1. In heterogeneous societies, a person may be a member of several subcultures at any one time or at different times in his or her life.
B. A COUNTERCULTURE is a subculture that adheres to “a set of norms and values that sharply contradict the dominant norms and values of the society of which that group is a part.”
1. Ideologically, countercultures adhere to a set of beliefs and values that radically reject the society’s dominant culture and prescribe an alternative set.
C. Every group forms an IDIOCULTURE, a system of shared knowledge, beliefs, behaviors, and customs created through enduring group interactions and shared experiences.
D. In most cultures, differences exist between what people are supposed to do and what they actually do; that is, there is a distinction between the IDEAL CULTURE and the REAL CULTURE. Regardless of the manner in which cultures are organized, all cultures share some basic concerns, known as CULTURAL UNIVERSALS. Food, shelter, and protection are examples.
E. A SOCIAL INSTITUTION is a system of norms, values, statuses, and roles that develops around a basic social goal.
1. All societies have particular institutions to meet their broad goals; they form the foundation of society. Five basic social institutions are defined in the text: the family, religion, education, economic, and political.
2. Institutions are systems of norms; social organizations are actual groups of people deliberately organized around some common interest. Both terms will be discussed further in the next chapters.
reference source
http://www.ega.edu/facweb/strickland/SOCI1101Online/CHAPTEROUTLINES/OutlineCHAPTER04.html
Introduction: The term “culture” means different things to different people. To some, it is associated with activities. ELITE CULTURE refers to the life style of the wealthy, affluent, or upper classes. POPULAR CULTURE is viewed as the culture, particularly the leisure time, of the common people.
A. A CULTURE is a system of ideas, values, beliefs, knowledge, norms, customs, and technology shared by almost everyone in a particular society. A SOCIETY is a group of people who share a common culture. The existence of culture depends on people’s ability to create and understand SYMBOLS, things that are used to represent something else.
1. SYMBOLS are arbitrary designations that are collective creations; most sociologists believe that the ability to use symbols is uniquely human.
2. Success or failure in many relationships, both personal and professional, often depends upon our ability to communicate symbolically.
B. LANGUAGE, the systematized usage of speech and hearing to convey or express feelings and ideas, is the most important set of symbols.
1. Language is uniquely human and is one of the basic distinctions between human beings and other forms of life, as demonstrated by the comparative studies of infants and chimpanzees.
2. Regular use of words over time and place, and the widespread use of certain words, indicate that language is an integral and universal part of culture. Linguistic symbols are learned and shared just like other cultural traits.
3. In addition to a verbal and written language, every culture develops a “silent language” of gestures, expressions, and mannerisms; knowledge of this nonverbal language can be very useful to those who must deal with people from different cultures.
4. The SAPIR-WHORF HYPOTHESIS suggests that our perceptions of reality and consequent behaviors are significantly influenced by the grammatical forms, labels, and categories provided by our language.
C. VALUES are shared ideas of what is important and worthwhile by the people in a society. Values often are emotionally charged and learned early in life.
1. Most values have both positive and negative counterparts.
2. When basic values conflict with one another, a person may experience guilt or mental stress and attempt to resolve the guilt by pursuing alternative courses of action.
3. Despite the social diversity of the United States, Robin M. Williams (1970) described 15 major value orientations that are shared in our culture, including belief in achievement and success, external conformity, and democracy.
4. Williams states that most conflicts between value systems in the United States occur between values centering around individual personalities and values organized around categorical themes or conceptions. Group discrimination and racism, for example, are contrary to other central values of our society.
5. An understanding of value systems can be useful for many people in their work. The ability to recognize and deal with competing value systems leads to better management.
D. Social NORMS are rules of conduct or social expectations specifying how people should or should not behave in various social situations. Norms are either prescriptive or proscriptive.
1. William G. Sumner identified two types of norms, FOLKWAYS and MORES, and distinguished between them by (1) the degree to which group members are compelled to conform to them, (2) their importance, (3) the severity of punishment if they are violated, and (4) the intensity of feelings associated with adherence to them.
2. FOLKWAYS are learned customs or conventions that are passed down from one generation to the next; violation tends to be punished mildly, if at all.
3. MORES are considered more important than folkways; reactions to their violations are more serious. They tend to involve clear-cut distinctions between right and wrong and are more closely identified with society’s important values. Mores that prohibit something, that state “thou shalt not,” are called TABOOS. To care for one’s child is called a MOS (singular for MORES), while committing incest is a TABOO.
4. LAWS are formal, standardized expressions of norms enacted by legislative bodies to regulate particular types of behaviors. Laws state the punishment for their violation and are enforced by a group designated for that purpose.
5. When a law does not reflect folkways and mores, its enforcement is likely to be ignored or given low priority.
6. Cultural norms are not always beneficial to the society, group, or individual that follows them. Some may actually be harmful in what Erich Fromm calls the “PATHOLOGY OF NORMALCY.”
7. The process of violating norms beyond the range of group acceptability is termed deviance; the process of applying sanctions to obtain social conformity is known as social control.
E. TECHNOLOGY is the practical production and application of material techniques and products to maintain a culture’s standard of living; it includes social customs and practical techniques for converting raw materials into finished products.
1. ARTIFACTS are physical objects that reflect a society’s technology. Artifacts provide clues to a society’s level of technological development, but the presence of more sophisticated technology in one culture as opposed to another culture should not be used as scientific criteria for evaluating the two. It is a mistake to dismiss a culture’s technological system because it appears to be less developed or complex than our own.
F. CULTURAL LAG takes place when changes in technology and material culture occur more rapidly than changes in nonmaterial culture (such as beliefs, values, and laws); cultural lag is inevitable in rapidly changing societies.
II. Interpreting Culture: Our Own and Others
A. Sumner defined ETHNOCENTRISM as “that view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it.” It is the attitude that one’s own culture is superior to others; that one’s own beliefs, values, and behaviors are more correct than others; and that other people and cultures can be evaluated in terms of one’s own culture.
1. Ethnocentrism is particularly strong among people who have had little contact with other cultures; yet ethnocentric attitudes are found among the highly educated and experienced travelers as well.
2. The functions of ethnocentrism include (1) promoting unity, (2) encouraging conformity, (3) reinforcing nationalism, and (4) maintaining the status quo.
3. The dysfunctions of ethnocentrism include (1) increasing resistance to beneficial change, (2) discouraging integration, (3) increasing the likelihood of hostility and conflicts among groups, and (4) preventing beneficial social change.
B. XENOCENTRISM, the opposite of ethnocentrism, is the belief that one’s own lifestyle, products, or ideas are inferior to those of other cultures.
C. TEMPOROCENTRISM is the belief that one’s own time is more important than the past or future. Historical events are judged not in their own context, but rather on the basis of contemporary standards. It is most prevalent among those who lack historical perspective.
D. The belief that cultures must be judged on their own terms is known as CULTURAL RELATIVISM.
1. Cultural relativism means that a behavior appropriate in one place may not be appropriate everywhere.
2. Knowledge of cultural relativism can be useful to anyone who works with people from different cultures.
III. Cultural Complexity and Diversity
Culture is a complex and diverse system of independent factors; its organization is influenced by physical circumstances such as climate, geography, and population. The complexity of a culture can best be understood by examining various units of a culture.
A. SUBCULTURES are groups of people who participate in the larger, dominant culture yet also maintain their own distinctive life styles and set of cultural elements as well.
1. In heterogeneous societies, a person may be a member of several subcultures at any one time or at different times in his or her life.
B. A COUNTERCULTURE is a subculture that adheres to “a set of norms and values that sharply contradict the dominant norms and values of the society of which that group is a part.”
1. Ideologically, countercultures adhere to a set of beliefs and values that radically reject the society’s dominant culture and prescribe an alternative set.
C. Every group forms an IDIOCULTURE, a system of shared knowledge, beliefs, behaviors, and customs created through enduring group interactions and shared experiences.
D. In most cultures, differences exist between what people are supposed to do and what they actually do; that is, there is a distinction between the IDEAL CULTURE and the REAL CULTURE. Regardless of the manner in which cultures are organized, all cultures share some basic concerns, known as CULTURAL UNIVERSALS. Food, shelter, and protection are examples.
E. A SOCIAL INSTITUTION is a system of norms, values, statuses, and roles that develops around a basic social goal.
1. All societies have particular institutions to meet their broad goals; they form the foundation of society. Five basic social institutions are defined in the text: the family, religion, education, economic, and political.
2. Institutions are systems of norms; social organizations are actual groups of people deliberately organized around some common interest. Both terms will be discussed further in the next chapters.
reference source
http://www.ega.edu/facweb/strickland/SOCI1101Online/CHAPTEROUTLINES/OutlineCHAPTER04.html
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